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Abstract: Although there are many stock market anomalies which the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH) finds difficult to explain, it also has its strengths, and so far no alternative 
hypothesis has been developed which can explain what the EMH explains but which can also 
do a better job in explaining the phenomena with which it struggles. It is argued that the 
way forward is to postulate that the stock market can be in one of three states: a 
fundamental state, in which share prices are determined as in the EMH, a bubble or bull 
market state, in which share prices are above their fundamental levels but continue to rise 
because asset holders expect to sell the shares at even higher prices in the future, and a bear 
market state, in which shares are held exclusively by ‘irrational’ agents and rational agents 
cannot exploit the overvaluation because of short-selling constraints. It is also argued that 
heterogeneous rational expectations may help explain some features of stock market 
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1. Introduction 
 
The 2013 award of the Nobel Prize in Economics to both Eugene Fama and Robert 
Shiller seemed a puzzle to many, since they are associated with very different and seemingly 
incompatible views of how the stock market works.1 Fama, in particular, is regarded as the 
leading academic proponent of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) and Shiller is the 
leading academic critic of the hypothesis. Surely they both cannot be right? 
The purpose of this paper is to argue that Fama and Shiller are both (largely) right, 
and to outline an approach to explaining the behaviour of the stock market which can 
reconcile their seemingly divergent views. According to this approach share prices can be 
determined as postulated by the EMH, modified to incorporate heterogeneous rational 
expectations and transactions costs. However, the stock market can be in one of two other 
states or regimes: a bubble or bull market state, in which share prices are above their 
fundamental values but rational agents may hold the shares because they expect share 
prices will rise further, and a bear market state in which shares are overvalued and held 
exclusively by irrational agents; rational agents cannot exploit the overvaluation because of 
short-selling constraints. One important consideration is that agents in each state may need 
to take into account the implications of the fact that the state may change – for example, 
the fundamental state may change into a bubble, or a bubble might collapse and the market 
may enter a bear market state. 
The paper proceeds by first of all outlining the EMH and its strengths. The anomalies 
are then discussed, and much of the remainder of the paper is devoted to developing the 
                                                 
1
 There was a third Nobel laureate in 2013, Lars Peter Hansen, whose work is less relevant for the topic of this 
paper. For an evaluation of the three 2013 laureates’ contributions, which emphasises their similarities rather 
than their differences, see Campbell (2014).  
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alternative hypothesis and discussing how it might explain the behaviour of the stock 
market. 
2. The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Since the EMH is central to the understanding of stock markets, it is worthwhile 
describing its essential features, its underlying assumptions and some of the evidence in its 
favour. 
To start, we might take the following fundamental equation, (which we describe, 
following the literature, as the standard efficient market or no arbitrage condition): 
                                                 1 1[ ] / (1 ).t t tP E P D r         (1) 
Notation is standard. Pt is the price of a share at time t and Dt is the dividend it pays. The rate 
at which investors discount future returns is given by r. For simplicity this is assumed to be 
constant, but there is no problem (at least in principle) in making it time varying. The 
equation states that the current price of a share equals the expected price next period plus 
the dividend expected to be received next period, appropriately discounted.2 We can 
interpret r as the expected return investors must be offered to hold a share, so equation (1) 
essentially states that it is expected that this share generates this return. If the equation fails 
to hold, then investors will make purchases or sales which will restore equality. For example, 
suppose the expected future price plus dividend (i.e. Pt+1 + Dt+1) is greater than (1 + r)Pt. Then 
investors can get a higher expected return by holding this share than from holding other 
shares, so we would expect investors would sell these other shares to buy the share in 
question, and this process will continue until equality is restored. 
                                                 
2
 It is assumed that the price at time t is the ‘ex dividend’ price as far as any dividend payable at that time is 
concerned. 
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 Equation (1) should hold if all investors are rational and have identical expectations 
and also if there are no transactions costs. Note that these assumptions are sufficient and 
not necessary. A point often made by proponents of the EMH is that it is by no means 
necessary for equation (1) to hold that all investors be rational. It is only necessary that 
‘enough’ investors are rational. Suppose there are many non-rational investors, and, in the 
absence of rational investors, their share buying and selling behaviour would produce an 
expected return on the share of less than r. Then rational investors should sell the share in 
question (they might sell it short if they do not hold the share), and in doing so the share 
price falls until equation (1) is re-established. 
 The assumption of zero transactions costs is probably not that crucial. There are 
many investors for whom the transactions costs of buying and selling shares are fairly small, 
so we would expect equation (1) to hold approximately even with transactions costs. 
 However, equation (1) is not the EMH. By iteration and repeated substitution (and 
applying the law of ‘iterated expectations’), we can obtain the following expression for share 
prices at time 0: 
 0
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This states that the price of a share at time t is the sum of two components. The first term – 
the expected present value of the discounted price as time goes to infinity – might be 
described as a ‘bubble’ term (so we define the bubble term as 0
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). The second 
term is the discounted present value of the expected future stream of dividends and may be 
described as the ‘fundamental value’ of the share. The EMH may then be stated as the 
hypothesis that the price of a share equals its fundamental value: 
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This follows from equation (2) with the additional assumption that the bubble term is zero. 
This is how we will interpret the EMH. The essential debate is over whether this equation is a 
basically correct theory about how share prices are determined. Note that the EMH depends 
on two components. We need to combine an assumption that the efficient market condition 
holds with the assumption that the bubble term is zero. We will discuss this latter 
assumption later in the paper. 
We will be brief in discussing the evidence in favour of the hypothesis. There is a 
huge amount of relevant empirical evidence. The bulk of empirical work in the 1960s and 
1970s was supportive: e.g. ‘there is no other proposition in economics which has more solid 
empirical evidence supporting it than the Efficient Markets Hypothesis’ (Jensen, 1978, p. 95). 
More recent work has been more sceptical; we will discuss some of this work later. 
However, it is probably fair to say that there are two predictions of the hypothesis which 
have survived fairly although perhaps not completely intact. These are the results that 
(1) Stock prices react to news, and 
(2) It is impossible to beat the market systematically. 
This first prediction seems trite, almost trivial. Every day, there are reports in the financial 
press of news affecting companies and how their shares prices react. That share prices react 
to news is not in doubt. Whether they react exactly to the extent that the EMH predicts is 
another question. This is a difficult question to answer as it is not easy to obtain a good 
estimate of a firm’s fundamental value and how it changes. The second prediction seems to 
hold as well. There are many studies showing that so-called ‘experts’ do not, on average 
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beat the market (see, for example, Malkiel, 2003, pp. 76 – 80). Consider, for example, the 
following well-known passage from Richard Roll, an academic financial economist who is 
also a portfolio manager: 
‘I have personally tried to invest money, my client’s money and my own, in every single 
anomaly and predictive device that academics have dreamed up…I have attempted to 
exploit the so-called year-end anomalies and a whole variety of strategies supposedly 
documented by academic research. And I have yet to make a nickel on any of these supposed 
market inefficiencies…a true market inefficiency ought to be an exploitable opportunity. If 
there’s nothing investors can exploit in a systematic way, time in and time out, then it’s very 
hard to say that information is not being properly incorporated into stock prices’ (quoted in 
Malkiel, 2003, p. 72). 
 So we will consider it a basic requirement of any alternative theory of the stock 
market that it is consistent with the predictions of the EMH that stock prices react to news 
and that it is impossible (or at least extremely difficult) to beat the market systematically. 
3. Empirical Evidence against the EMH 
 
However, since the early 1980s, there have been a number of empirical challenges to 
the EMH, and there is now a long list of so-called ‘anomalies’, of which we would mention 
the following: 
(1) Shares are sometimes massively overvalued, in the sense that they far exceed any 
reasonable estimate of their fundamental value. There are examples from the internet 
bubble which ended in 2000. Appendix I gives one such example. Papers which argue for this 
conclusion include Ofek and Wilson (2002). 
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(2) Shiller (1981) argued that stock prices are far more volatile than the EMH can justify 
(‘excess volatility’). There has been much debate about these conclusions. Shiller (2014) 
provides a fairly up-to-date account of the literature and results on excess volatility. There 
seems to be a consensus now that Shiller’s contention is basically correct – it does not seem 
to be something that the proponents of the EMH have effectively challenged. 
(3) Bubbles in share prices sometimes occur. A ‘bubble’ occurs when a share price is above 
its fundamental value, but rises in price since it is bought by agents who expect to resell it at 
a yet higher price. So equations (1) and (2) above hold in a bubble, but not equation (3). 
Plausible examples are the South Sea Bubble and Dutch Tulip mania. (For a list of famous 
bubbles, see pp. 170 – 1 of Shleifer, 2000.) A more recent example is the dot-com bubble 
that ended in March 2000. But it is difficult to establish that these are bubbles; after all, 
large increases in share prices are not incompatible with the EMH – they can be explained 
easily if there is a large change in fundamentals. 
There is a massive literature testing for the occurrence of bubbles, which it is 
impossible to discuss at any length here. There are also historical analyses of various 
purported bubble episodes (e.g. Garber, 1990), which argue that they were no such thing. 
But there are other analyses of such episodes which reach different conclusions. For 
example: ‘the qualitative evidence assembled in this paper favors the view that a bubble was 
present in the 1929 market’ (White, 1990, p. 67). Without wishing to make a judgment 
about whether specific market episodes were or were not bubbles, we regard the 
contention that stock market bubbles sometimes exist as highly plausible, and how and why 
they occur is something that any satisfactory theory of the stock market needs to explain. 
For a recent survey of the literature on bubbles, see Scherbina and Schlusche (2014). 
7 
 
(4) Crashes in share prices happen and large downward movements in share prices are much 
more common than large upward movements. (See, for example, Hong and Stein, 2003). 
While large falls in stock prices are not, of course, incompatible with the EMH, the EMH 
would seem to require that such falls are due to large negative pieces of news, and many 
share price crashes do not seem to be accompanied by such news. 
(5) There are the so-called calendar anomalies (see, for example, chapter 18 of Siegel, 2002). 
One example is provided by the fact that the return on Mondays over the period 1946 – 
2001 on the Dow Jones was -0.0689% whereas that on Fridays was 0.0734%; the biggest 
return is on the last day before Christmas, of 0.3291%. (See Table 18-2 on p. 311 of Siegel, 
2002.) The most famous calendar anomaly is of course the January effect; for some relatively 
recent evidence that the effect has persisted into the twenty first century, see Haug and 
Hirschey (2006). 
(6) There is evidence that ‘momentum’ strategies, whereby shares that have recently risen 
(fallen) in price are bought (sold) do generate excess returns. For example, Jegadeesh and 
Titman (2001) present evidence that strategies that buy stocks that have done well over a 
period of 3 to 12 months and sell stocks that have done badly over the same period tend to 
generate profits of about one percent per month over the following year. Fama has 
described the momentum result as ‘the biggest challenge to market efficiency’ (Fama, 2014, 
p. 1480). Actually, these studies are ‘ex post’ studies that show that if one had used these 
strategies in the period under consideration, one would have made excess returns. It does 
not follow that one can use these strategies to make excess returns in the future – it might 
well be that enough people start using the techniques and in doing so eliminate the 
opportunity to make excess returns.  
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(7) Long run ‘mean reversion’ in stock prices may occur. If share prices follow a random walk, 
which is an implication of the EMH with a constant discount rate, then the level of the stock 
market will be irrelevant to its subsequent movement. So if share prices are high, this has no 
implications at all for whether they are likely to continue to rise or fall. However, there is 
some evidence for ‘mean reversion’ in share prices (the classic reference is Poterba and 
Summers, 1988). So if share prices are well above their long-run average, they are likely to 
move back toward this average, and so forth. 
(8) Shleifer (1986) conducted an ingenious test of the EMH, by examining the behaviour of 
shares which were included in, or excluded from, certain stock prices indices. When an 
announcement is made that a certain share is to be included in a stock market index, this 
may induce buying by index funds, which hold shares not on the basis of their expected 
returns, but in accordance with their weight in a certain index. Shleifer found that 
announcements that certain shares were to be included in, or excluded from, a stock market 
index did have significant effects on their prices. This seems to contradict the EMH, 
according to which a decision by an agent to purchase a share should not change its price in 
the absence of a change in its fundamental value – if such a purchase does tend to raise a 
share price above its fundamental value, this will be offset by share sales by rational agents 
which bring the share price back to its fundamental level. 
(9) There is some evidence of both underreaction and overreaction to news announcements. 
(See pp. 114 - 120 of Shleifer, 2000, for evidence of underreaction; the following pp. 120 – 
127 contains evidence of overreaction.) It might be asked how the stock market can exhibit 
both overreaction and underreaction; it would seem to be possible if the reactions take 
place over different horizons – it may be that underreaction takes place in the few months 
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after (say) an earnings announcement, whereas overreaction takes place over several years 
following a series of announcements of good or bad news. 
This is by no means a comprehensive list of the purported empirical failings of the 
EMH. Nevertheless, not all adherents of the EMH have been persuaded. For most of the 
above anomalies, explanations have been put forward which are compatible with the EMH. 
For example, large increases in stock prices can be explained by a big improvement in 
fundamentals or by a significant fall in the discount rate. We will briefly review the question 
whether the EMH is compatible with these seeming anomalies below. 
4. Investment Advice, the Views of Market Practitioners and the Behaviour of Investors 
If the stock market does indeed behave (approximately) as the EMH predicts, but 
there are transactions costs in buying and selling shares, then the implications for investor 
behaviour are quite clear cut. A risk-averse investor should buy and hold a diversified 
portfolio of shares. She should only trade to re-balance her portfolio or to change the overall 
size of her portfolio. So, if she owns a share that rises considerably in price, she may become 
overweight in that share, so considerations of risk management should induce her to sell 
part of her holding of the share. If she owns a share that falls in price, she should 
emphatically not sell it – if anything, she should buy more of it, since she may be 
underweight in it. But this differs significantly from the advice often given to investors. For 
example, many investment advisors recommend a ‘stop-loss’ rule, whereby a share is 
automatically sold if it falls more than (say) 20% below a previous peak. Such a rule makes 
absolutely no sense if one believes in the EMH. The fact that a share price may have fallen 
considerably has no implications for the future movement of that share, and does not mean 
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that its expected return has fallen. If anything, one should buy more of a share that has 
fallen in price, in order to re-balance one’s portfolio.3 
 There are many other ways in which stock market professionals deviate from what 
the EMH would predict. For example, shares are often given ‘buy’ or ‘sell’ recommendations 
by analysts. If the EMH holds, then all shares have the same expected return adjusted for 
risk, so such recommendations are pointless. (What would be valuable would be information 
on the risk properties of various shares – more specifically, information on how returns on 
different shares are correlated with each other, which would be helpful in deciding on the 
structure of a portfolio that minimises risk for any given expected return, but such 
information is not typically given.) 
Much discussion of stock markets and investment advice presupposes a ‘non EMH’ 
framework. For example, there is considerable discussion of ‘bull’ and ‘bear’ markets. But if 
the EMH holds, it is difficult to see how there can be a bear or bull market. A bull market is 
one in which shares are persistently rising; if the market rises because of the realisation of a 
few pieces of good news, then this has no implications at all for the future movement of the 
market – believing that the market will rise further because it has risen in the recent past is 
hence analogous to believing that if a coin is tossed a number of times and usually comes up 
‘heads’ then such an outcome is more likely in the future.  
A further point is that turnover in the stock market seems much greater than what 
would be consistent with investors behaving in accordance with the EMH, according to 
                                                 
3
 For an attempt by the author to show the absurdity of a stop-loss rule, see Fender (2001). These arguments 
did not meet with universal approval, as a perusal of the letters columns of the Investors Chronicle in the 
following few weeks will reveal.  
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which investors should sell shares only if they need to re-balance their portfolios or if they 
need to reduce the overall size of their portfolio (perhaps to finance consumption). 
Perhaps practitioners are just ignorant. But another possibility, which is at least 
worth considering, is that their views may be more reasonable if the stock market operates 
in a way less consistent with the EMH. Indeed, the approach we present in this paper may be 
more compatible with the views of many practitioners, something we regard as mildly 
supportive of our approach. 
5. Theoretical Arguments Relating to the EMH 
The EMH will hold if agents are homogenous and rational, if there are no transactions 
costs and if bubbles can be ruled out. Of course these assumptions do not hold exactly, and 
economists have devoted considerable effort into exploring whether and how the 
hypothesis changes if the assumptions are relaxed. In this section we discuss some relevant 
contributions that have been made. 
One powerful argument was that of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) who established 
that there cannot be a perfectly informationally efficient market if there are costs of 
gathering information. Suppose that the EMH holds and shares follow a random walk, but 
also that it is costly to gather information about the fundamental values of shares. Then the 
return to gathering such information will be zero so no information will be gathered. But this 
means there will be no one to identify, and step in to rectify, divergences from market 
efficiency, so there is no reason for the market to be efficient. Presumably share prices need 
to diverge from their fundamental values sometimes; such divergences can be exploited by 
those agents who gather information in order to exploit asset inefficiencies. So, it would 
seem, the stock market, and other markets, cannot be perfectly efficient. But this does not 
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prevent the markets being approximately efficient, with small divergences from efficiency 
generating the incentives for some agents to gather enough information – and exploit it - to 
make the market behave in this way. 
Another argument was that of Miller (1977), who pointed out that if there are short- 
selling constraints, there may be no way in which rational agents can exploit stock market 
overvaluation. Perhaps share prices have been inflated by the purchases of a few zealots. If 
rational agents do not hold the shares, the only way they can exploit the overvaluation is to 
sell the shares short, but short-selling constraints may prevent them from doing this. 
 The above arguments are arguments for thinking that the efficient market equation 
(equation (1)) may not always hold. As far as the second component of the EMH is 
concerned (the assumption that the bubble term is zero), there has been considerable 
discussion in the literature of whether rational bubbles are possible. If a share is overvalued, 
then it still may be held by rational investors if they expect they will be able to sell it to 
investors in the future at a still higher price. But these investors will only, rationally, be 
willing to buy the share at this higher price if they expect they will be able to sell it at a yet 
higher price sometime in the future, and so on ad infinitum (the ‘greater fool’ hypothesis). Is 
this compatible with rationality? A number of papers have explored this issue rigorously (e.g. 
Tirole, 1982 and 1985, Santos and Woodford, 1997). It turns out that in many economies, 
bubbles can be ruled out. The basic argument is that ‘the existence of a bubble would 
require asymptotic growth in the value of the asset in question, and hence asymptotic 
growth of the wealth of at least one of the households, at a rate inconsistent with 
optimization by that household’ (Santos and Woodford, op. cit., p. 20). Further work has 
confirmed that the conditions under which rational asset pricing bubbles are possible are 
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fairly restrictive. Should we then conclude that bubbles are implausible? It might be pointed 
out that the type of rationality necessary for these results to go through is very strong. It is 
necessary that investors at time t believe that investors at all future times (t + 1, t + 2, t + 
3,…) are rational. But this is not enough. It is also necessary that investors at any time 
believe that investors in the next time period believe that investors in the future will be 
rational, and so forth. An extremely demanding condition, analogous to common 
knowledge, is required. It can be seen how, if the condition fails, a bubble can emerge. 
Suppose investors at time t are rational and believe that investors at all future times are 
rational, but also believe that investors at some future time t + m do not believe investors at 
time n (with n > m) will be rational. Specifically, suppose they believe that because of this 
non-rationality investors at time t + m will believe that share prices at time t + n will be twice 
their fundamental value. Then investors at time t believe investors at time t + m will bid 
share prices up because of this anticipated overvaluation, and hence they likewise bid share 
prices up at time t for the very same reason. So it seems that the requirements on beliefs 
needed to rule out bubbles are very strong – it needs to be believed that there is no chance 
that asset prices in any future period will be overvalued, that there is no chance investors 
believe that investors at any time period in the future may not be rational, that there is no 
chance investors believe that future investors believe that investors in the even further 
future will be anything other than rational, and so forth. 
6. Detour on Methodology (Kuhn, with influence from Popper and Quine) 
Here an approach to explaining scientific revolutions pioneered by Thomas Kuhn  is 
outlined (see Kuhn, 1970) which, although it was developed with the case of Einstein’s 
overthrow of Newtonian physics in mind, will be argued to be particularly relevant in 
14 
 
explaining the current and recent state of academic work on the stock market. The 
fundamental concept in Kuhn’s theory is that of a ‘paradigm’, which may be defined as a 
‘universally recognized scientific achievement that for a time provides model problems and 
solutions to a community of practitioners.’ (Kuhn, 1970, p. viii). Newtonian physics was such 
a paradigm for several hundred years; it explained many phenomena and seemed to offer 
the hope of explaining many more. 
Much of scientific activity is ‘normal science’, attempting to use the paradigm to 
explain phenomena that have not hitherto been explained using the paradigm, but which 
practitioners believe may be capable of being so explained. It may take a great deal of work 
to do this. Sometimes the relevant hypothesis does not seem to be confirmed but that does 
not lead to rejection of the hypothesis – it is (almost) impossible to refute a scientific 
hypothesis unambiguously, because testing scientific hypotheses invariably involves testing 
several hypotheses (i.e. one needs auxiliary hypotheses as well as the main hypothesis that 
is being tested), so that if the test fails, it is not clear what is responsible. If the test fails, a 
sensible approach may be to assume that one of the auxiliary hypotheses fails. 
However, there may come a time when ‘anomalies’ accumulate. These are 
observations which seem to contradict the hypothesis, and which cannot be explained away 
despite persistent attempts. An example would be the period, starting in the late nineteenth 
century and which lasted until Einstein’s special theory of relativity emerged in 1905, when 
Newtonian physics seemed unable to explain many anomalies but there was no plausible 
alternative explanation. In such a period there is a ‘crisis’ in the science – the dominant 
paradigm is believed (by many) to be unsatisfactory, but there is no consensus on what 
should replace it. 
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Eventually, a new paradigm may appear; this needs to be capable of explaining what 
the old paradigm explained, but seems to offer a better chance of explaining what the old 
paradigm could not explain. In physics, this was Einsteinian physics, which was able to 
explain what Newtonian physics could but which could also explain - or at least offered the 
hope of explaining - some of the anomalous phenomena. 
 It should be clear how we might attempt to apply this approach to the theory of the 
stock market. The dominant paradigm is, of course, the EMH. When this emerged, it 
explained and clarified numerous observations, and provided hope of explaining many other 
unexplained phenomena. A massive amount of work in finance has been within the 
framework of the EMH paradigm. But it seems to be the case now that a fair number of 
anomalies have emerged which cannot be easily explained by the paradigm. So what 
happens now? According to Kuhn: ‘… all crises close in one of three ways. Sometimes normal 
science ultimately proves able to handle the crisis-provoking problem despite the despair of 
those who have seen it as the end of an existing paradigm. On other occasions, the problem 
resists even apparently radical new approaches…Or, finally…a crisis may end with the 
emergence of a new candidate for paradigm and with the ensuing battle over its acceptance’ 
(op. cit., p. 84).  
 One possibility is that the current crisis in the theory of the stock market could be 
resolved in favour of the EMH. But given the number and persistence of the anomalies, this 
seems unlikely. It is perhaps possible that no remedy will emerge – this is Kuhn’s second 
way. The third possibility is that a new paradigm emerges which eventually supplants the 
EMH. Do we have such a candidate at the moment? Some may suggest behavioural finance. 
But it seems difficult to disagree with Fama who writes: ‘the behavioral literature has not 
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put forth a full blown model for prices and returns that can be tested and potentially 
rejected – the acid test for any model proposed as a replacement for another model.’ (Fama, 
2014, p. 1477.) There does not seem to be a behavioural theory of the stock market that can 
explain why it is impossible to systematically beat the market, why stock prices react to news 
and why bubbles and crashes might occur, for example. To qualify as a candidate to supplant 
the dominant paradigm, the alternative hypothesis must account for what the previous 
paradigm can explain, and also offer hope of resolving the anomalies. In the rest of this 
paper we put forward some suggestions of how such a theory might be developed. But first, 
in the next section, we discuss whether it is possible for the EMH to be extended in any 
plausible way to explain the anomalies. 
7. Can the EMH Explain the Anomalies? 
 Considerable effort and ingenuity have been expended by adherents of the EMH to 
explain the empirical anomalies listed in Section 3. We do not discuss these attempts at any 
length. However, we would mention that believers in the EMH seem to acknowledge that 
the existence of transactions costs means the market will not be perfectly efficient, and that 
small deviations from market efficiency are required to generate incentives for agents to 
gather information to exploit market inefficiencies. If this is the case, then there may be a 
‘band’ about the fundamental price of a share within which the share price can fluctuate 
without there being exploitable excess returns. It may be possible to explain some anomalies 
in this way. Take for example, the calendar anomalies mentioned above – these anomalies 
suggest fairly small excess returns from strategies such as (say) buying just before a holiday 
and selling afterwards, and it is quite possible that these excess returns are outweighed by 
the transactions costs of implementing the strategy. 
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 Calculation costs may also be significant. It may not be a trivial task, by any means, to 
work out a firm’s fundamental value. These are costs that presumably are borne by the 
traders who intervene to ensure market efficiency. They may need to study a large number 
of firms before they find one that is sufficiently mispriced so as to offer an opportunity of 
excess returns. To compensate traders for these costs, there presumably need to be some 
further deviations from market efficiency which they can exploit. Also, a trader may need to 
make a large purchase or sale of shares to gain from a mispricing of a firm’s shares sufficient 
to outweigh these costs, which might be largely independent of the number of shares 
transacted. It may be difficult to make these purchases without changing the share price 
(but this of course depends, inter alia, on the size of the firm). For example, suppose that a 
trader needs to make an excess profit of £10,000 each trade to compensate for the costs of 
investigating this particular trade and also the costs of investigating shares he decides not to 
buy or sell. Then if he is contemplating buying 100,000 shares, he will only do so if he can 
obtain them at a price at least 10p below their fundamental value. If such a purchase raises 
the share price by, say, 5p, then he will only make the purchase if the initial price of the 
shares is at least 15p below their fundamental value. So this may be another reason why 
there may be a ‘band’ around the fundamental value of a share, within which its price can 
fluctuate without inducing purchases or sales by traders expecting to make excess returns. 
Also, the band, if it exists for this reason, may be considerably greater for small market 
capitalisation firms than for large ones. 
 It seems usually assumed in the exposition of the EMH that rational investors are all 
the same, so have the same discount rate and same expectations. But there is no need for 
this to be the case. Surely agents could have different discount rates, perhaps because of 
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differences in risk aversion? Also, it might be suggested that not all rational agents have the 
same expectations. We discuss the plausibility of this assumption in Appendix II. 
If rational agents do indeed have heterogeneous expectations, then the EMH needs 
reformulating, since there is now no such thing as ‘the’ fundamental value of a share – each 
agent will have his own estimate of the fundamental value of a share. So the EMH should 
state that the value of a share equals its fundamental value as estimated by the marginal 
trader. 
If there is such heterogeneity amongst rational agents, one or two of the anomalies 
can be explained. Such heterogeneity can give rise to downward sloping demand curves for 
stocks, so that Shleifer’s evidence about the effect of shares being included in stock market 
indices can be explained. If index funds start buying a large quantity of a particular share for 
this reason, then the shareholders with the most pessimistic expectations about its 
prospects may have already sold their holdings, so that the purchasers need to offer a higher 
price to induce holders of the shares with more optimistic expectations to part with their 
holdings. 
How much share prices change in response to an exogenous change in supply is of 
course an empirical question. One might conjecture that for some shares, held mainly by a 
few traders who derive their information from the same sources, the demand curve might 
be close to horizontal. However, for some other shares, perhaps held by traders with very 
different information sets and beliefs, the price elasticity might be much greater. 
 So it may be possible for the EMH to explain some of the anomalies if it is extended 
to incorporate transactions costs, calculation costs and also heterogeneous rational agents. 
But it seems very difficult to explain all the anomalies. The excess volatility argument, the 
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extreme overvaluation of certain shares and momentum effects seem very difficult to 
explain even with these extensions of the hypothesis. It seems reasonable, then, to consider 
whether there are other ways of explaining these anomalies, and this is what we intend to 
do in the remainder of this paper.  
8. Foundations of a General Theory of the Stock Market: Irrational Agents and Short-
Selling Constraints 
So how do we explain the anomalies, but preserve the insights of the EMH? We need 
a ‘General Theory’, one which explains what the EMH does not explain as well as what it 
does explain. 
Let us consider the case of the incredibly overvalued share price (of Baltimore 
Technologies) considered in Appendix I below, and ask how its shares could be so valued. 
There are two possibilities. One is that there is a bubble – the share price is overvalued 
because there are expectations that it will be even more overvalued in the future. But 
suppose there is also no general expectation of a rise in the share price, so the bubble 
explanation does not work; could the overvaluation still exist? It could, provided that two 
conditions are met: 
(1) The shares must be held by someone. However given that they are above their 
fundamental value and there is no expectation of a rise in their prices, they cannot be held 
by rational investors. Therefore they must be held by irrational investors. So the existence of 
irrational agents, often called ‘noise traders’, is necessary for such an overvaluation. 
(2) It must be impossible for rational investors to exploit the overvaluation, in this case by 
short selling. There is much literature on short-selling constraints and agreement that such 
selling is generally costly and risky (see e.g. Jones and Lamont, 2002). It is sometimes 
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regarded as reasonable to assume that shorting is impossible and this is the approach we 
will take here – we will assume that short selling is either impossible or costly and rarely 
undertaken, and discuss some of its implications. (An assumption that short selling is 
impossible is fairly common in the literature now). 
The basic idea behind this paper is that the key to developing a ‘General Theory of the 
Stock Market’ (GTSM) involves three crucial assumptions: 
(1) An assumption that there are a considerable number of irrational traders (as well as a 
large number of rational investors) active in the stock market. 
(2) An assumption that short selling is impossible (or at least costly and fairly rare).  
(3) An assumption that rational and irrational agents may interact in different ways in 
different circumstances.  
If this is done, we can explain how some shares can sometimes be overvalued. Note 
also that now the EMH (interpreted as the theory that stock prices are determined as in 
equation (3)) is not the same as the view that there cannot be exploitable excess returns. If a 
stock like Baltimore Technologies is overvalued by the EMH criterion, because it is held by 
irrational traders who have ‘fallen in love’ with the stock, and rational agents cannot exploit 
the overvaluation because of short-selling constraints, then there are no exploitable 
opportunities to make excess returns even though equation (3) does not hold. In this case, 
the following inequality would replace equation (1):  
 0 1 1[ ] / (1 ).P E P D r    (4) 
We now come to the basic idea behind the GTSM: 
The stock market can be in one of three states. It can be in a ‘fundamental state’; this is 
where equations (1) and (3) hold. Secondly, it can be in a bubble or bull market state; this is 
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where equation (1) holds but equation (3) does not (instead share prices are above their 
fundamental values). Thirdly, it can be in a bear market state; this is where shares prices are 
above their fundamental values but equation (1) does not hold; instead inequality (4) is 
satisfied. 
Much needs to be done to explain the behaviour of the stock market in each of the 
non-fundamental states (behaviour of the stock market in the fundamental state is much 
better understood than it is in the non-fundamental state, but there are still some puzzles.) 
Also, we need to be able to explain why and how one state may turn into another. In what 
follows, we discuss each of these states in turn. 
 9. The Bear Market 
 
A bear market may arise after the collapse of a bubble; share prices may not fall all 
the way to their fundamental values because shares are bought by noise traders before they 
do so. (Note that this requires at least some noise traders to be price sensitive – i.e. they buy 
more shares as their prices fall.) How prices change in a bear market depends on the 
behaviour of irrational agents. Here the insights of behavioural finance might be particularly 
relevant. We might expect share prices to fall, on average, for a number of reasons: 
1. There might be some short-selling pressure (an assumption of zero short selling is surely 
too extreme). 
2. Irrational agents might come to believe that the market is overvalued, and sell. (Some 
agents may not be totally irrational, but may learn over time.) 
3. Momentum strategies are quite important in practice, so the initial fall in prices might give 
rise to further selling pressure, further price falls, and so forth. 
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4. If overvalued shares are held by index funds, then as share prices fall, such shares might 
be expelled from the indices. The index funds therefore sell them and share prices hence 
decline further. 
5. If some agents have bought shares on margin, a decline in share prices might prompt 
margin calls, and agents might need to sell shares for this reason.   
We might expect fundamental values to rise over time; as share prices in a bear 
market can be expected to decline over time, eventually prices will return to fundamental 
values and we switch to a ‘fundamental’ regime. Share prices in a bear market might be 
expected to be particularly unpredictable (but not necessarily follow a random walk). 
So far we have thought of the bear market as comprised entirely of irrational traders. 
However, if we admit the possibility of heterogeneous rational agents, we can think of the 
bear market as comprised of both irrational and rational agents, but where the marginal 
investor is irrational. This provides another reason why the demand curve for shares in a 
bear market is downward sloping (as the share price falls, it falls below its fundamental value 
as estimated by more and more of the most optimistic rational agents, who hence buy); 
reversion to the fundamental market occurs when the marginal trader is a rational agent. 
There is also no reason why in a bear market share prices should not react to news, 
but this of course depends on irrational agents reacting to news. Whether they do, and if so 
the extent they do, may well depend on what type of irrational agent they are. This is 
something that needs further research. 
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10. The Bull Market (Or Bubble) 
This is characterised by equation (2) where the first term on the RHS (the bubble 
term) is positive. But equation (1) continues to hold. There are a number of points that 
might be made: 
1. Participation in a bubble is by no means irrational. It is rational to continue to hold shares 
as long as equation (1) holds, but this equation holds in a bubble. Evidence that some of the 
players in the South Sea bubble were rational is provided in Temin and Voth (2004). Similar 
evidence for the dot-com bubble between 1998 and 2000 is provided by Brunnermeier and 
Nagel (2004). 
2. Whether a rational bubble is possible (i.e. a bubble with all agents rational, which means 
they have, inter alia, appropriate ‘higher order’ beliefs about the rationality of other agents, 
including agents in the far future) has been a controversial and much studied topic. As 
argued in Section 5, these rationality assumptions are very demanding (much more 
demanding than the rationality assumption required to support equation (1), for example, 
and even this assumption may fail occasionally). We therefore need to develop models of 
bubbles that relax such extreme rationality assumptions, but there are few such models in 
the literature. (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003 and Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2003, are 
examples.) Developing tractable models of bubbles with rational and irrational agents would 
seem to be an important item on the research agenda. 
3. We do not know how a bubble starts. A plausible story is as follows: there is an important 
innovation that raises fundamental values in at least one sector of the economy. Rational 
agents hence bid share prices up. Irrational agents extrapolate the rise in prices and buy, 
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hence raising share prices above their fundamental levels; rational agents anticipate this 
overvaluation and buy as well. 
4. We also do not know how a bubble terminates. Some literature has stressed the need for 
a ‘synchronising event’ that brings an end to the bubble.4 The bubble may be kept going by 
agents believing that other agents believe that share prices will keep rising (there may be 
higher order beliefs involved as well); the bubble might start to collapse when some agents 
become sceptical that other agents believe that another group of agents believe that share 
prices will keep rising (or something similar), but getting the details right and modelling this 
in a plausible way may be very difficult indeed. It seems we are a long way away from having 
a satisfactory model of bubbles which would, in particular, explain how and when they start 
and how and when they end. 
 We might comment that if bubbles are ended by such synchronising events, then this 
would be an example of share prices reacting to news, but the movement in share prices 
might be very different from the change in the fundamental value of the shares. This is one 
way in which share prices in a bubble might react to news. A second way is that the size of 
the bubble might be affected by news. Whilst it is therefore perfectly compatible with the 
economy being in a bubble that share prices should react to news, there is virtually no 
empirical or theoretical work that explores how share prices react to news in a bubble – this 
is clearly something that needs further work. 
5. In a stochastic bubble (see Blanchard and Watson, 1982, pp. 297 – 299), both the 
probability of a collapse and what happens when the bubble collapses are relevant in 
explaining the behaviour of a bubble. If a bear market is expected to result after the bubble 
                                                 
4
 See for example, pp. 193 – 197 of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003).  
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ends, then the level of share prices in the bear market may well affect what happens in the 
bubble. So if (for example) something happens that increases the size of index funds, this 
may mean that share prices are not expected to fall as much following the end of a bubble, 
hence strengthening the bubble. 
6. We would conjecture that there are plenty of opportunities for behavioural finance to 
explain aspects of agents’ behaviour in a bubble, and hence be very relevant in developing 
plausible models of bubbles. 
11. The Fundamental Market 
It might be thought that our fundamental market behaves exactly as the EMH 
predicts the stock market behaves, so there is nothing new here. However, when we 
discussed the EMH in Section 7, we stressed the desirability of extending it to include 
nonzero transactions and calculation costs and heterogeneous rational agents, and we 
would want the fundamental market that is part of the GTSM to have these features as well. 
Transactions costs and calculation costs mean there is a ‘band’ around the 
fundamental value within which the share price can fluctuate independently of changes in 
fundamentals. Heterogeneous rational agents mean that the demand curve for shares 
almost certainly slopes downwards, so that, for example, an exogenous increase in the 
supply of shares would depress share prices. However, there are also complications due to 
the possibility that the economy might move from the fundamental state to a bull or bubble 
state. 
 Firstly, we might mention what we might describe as ‘bull market risk’. Suppose a 
firm’s share price rises above its fundamental value by an amount that exceeds the relevant 
transactions and calculation costs, so that one would expect rational agents to sell. But a 
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rational trader may not sell the share if he thinks a bull market may be about to start – i.e. if 
he suspects there may be further increases in the share price above its fundamental value. 
Perhaps this may raise the ‘ceiling’ of the band without affecting the floor. 
Secondly, agents may expect that, with some probability, the share price may 
become overvalued in the future because it might enter a bull or bear market. It is clear that 
such a possibility raises the price a rational agent should be willing to pay for the share 
above its current fundamental value. So share prices in the fundamental market might 
incorporate what we might describe as an ‘overvaluation premium’ which reflects this 
possibility. Notice that this differs from ‘bull market risk’, which arises when the share price 
rises; the overvaluation premium might always exist, raising share prices whether the 
market is rising or falling. It might often be fairly small or non-existent, but at times might 
become quite large, although this is conjecture. 
We might also ask whether heterogeneity of rational expectations is compatible with 
it being impossible to systematically beat the market. This is undoubtedly something that 
requires further work. We would point out that the fact that expectations may be different 
does not mean that one way of forming expectations is always better than another – one 
may be better than another in some circumstances but not in others. Also, we would expect 
that if there is an obvious way of beating the market this should be incorporated into all 
rational agents’ expectations. If one agent has expectations that seem to do consistently 
better than other agents, one would expect the agents whose expectations perform worse 
would try to improve them, perhaps by copying or investigating the expectations of those 
whose expectations seem to succeed. So heterogeneous rational expectations, which might 
be expected to change over time as agents learn, should be compatible with the result that it 
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is impossible to beat the market systematically, but on the other hand would not be 
incompatible with there being an investor who, perhaps because of superior skill or 
information processing ability, would be able to make excess returns. But such individuals 
might be fairly rare. 
12. How does the GTSM Explain the Anomalies? 
That share prices move in response to news is certainly compatible with the GTSM, 
although we need to understand more about how and why news causes share prices to 
move in both bull and bear markets. And the GTSM is also compatible with the idea that it is 
impossible to (systematically) beat the market. It is also clearly compatible with the views of 
stock market professionals who believe in bull and bear markets. Here is how the theory is 
capable, at least in principle, of explaining the other anomalies: 
Excess Valuations. Clearly the GTSM is compatible with excess valuations of shares. In both 
the bull and bear market regimes, prices exceed their fundamental values. 
Excess Volatility. According to the GTSM, share prices are sometimes equal to their 
fundamental values and sometimes above, but never below. This does not necessarily imply 
excess volatility, but it is easy to give a condition under which we would see excess volatility. 
Since the share price at time t ( tP ) must, by definition, equal the sum of its fundamental 
value ( tF ) and its bubble or excess value ( tB ), then the variance of the share price is given 
by 
 var( ) var( ) var( ) 2cov( , ).t t t t tP F B F B     (5) 
So there will be excess volatility unless the covariance between the fundamental and bubble 
value is negative and exceeds, in absolute value, half the variance of the bubble term. One 
would expect that this condition for excess volatility is usually satisfied. In particular, one 
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would expect the covariance between the fundamental value and bubble value of a share to 
be positive if bubbles tend to arise when there is an increase in fundamental values. It would 
seem then that the GTSM is capable of explaining excess volatility. Whether it can explain 
the amount of excess volatility exhibited is another matter and one would want to see this 
demonstrated, perhaps in a properly calibrated model of the GTSM. 
Bubbles. Clearly, the GTSM is compatible with the existence of bubbles, but of course it 
needs to be explained how and why bubbles emerge and how and why they end. (More 
generally, there needs to be an account of the circumstances under which one type of 
market might change to another type.) 
Crashes. These can occur under the GTSM for three reasons: (i) a large decline in 
fundamentals in a fundamental market; (ii) the ending of a bull market (collapse of a 
bubble); (iii) a fall in share prices because of a decision of a number of noise traders to sell in 
a bear market. So it is not at all implausible that we should occasionally see large downward 
movements in share prices without there being a large deterioration of fundamentals. 
Calendar Anomalies. These can perhaps be explained as movements within the band in a 
fundamental market due to such factors as sentiment. The anomalies seem to be too small 
to generate excess returns after transactions costs, etc., are taken into account. Also, there 
is no reason to suppose that such effects will not operate in bull and bear markets. 
Momentum Effects. Clearly there can be momentum effects in the upward direction in a bull 
market and in the downward direction in a bear market. 
Mean Reversion. If shares are sometimes at their fundamental levels, but sometimes 
experience bubbles which then burst and become bear markets before reverting over time 
to their fundamental levels, then we would expect to see mean reversion. 
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Downward-Sloping Demand Curves for Stocks. Shleifer’s evidence that share prices move in 
response to an exogenous change in demand can readily be explained by heterogeneous 
expectations in the fundamental state; it might be conjectured that exogenous changes in 
supply or demand might have similar effects in bull and bear markets, although this is 
something that does require confirmation. 
Overreaction and Underreaction. A share price may overreact to an improvement in 
fundamentals if the purchase of the shares by rational agents leads to irrational agents 
extrapolating the price increase and bidding the price above their fundamental value. A 
share price may underreact to a negative shock to fundamentals if purchases by irrational 
agents prevent the share price from falling all the way to its new fundamental level. 
Generally, a whole number of patterns of adjustment are possible in the GTSM. 
Stop-Loss Rules. Perhaps minor price downturns can occur in a bubble without signalling 
that the bubble is over (in which case it would not be rational to sell), whereas a larger 
downturn may signal that the bubble is over (and hence it may be rational to sell). 
Sometimes a stop-loss rule of 20% is recommended. It might be that practitioners have 
learned that a price decline of this magnitude generally signals the start of a bear market, so 
it might be rational to sell after such a price decline. 
Trading Volume. A model with heterogeneous agents (some irrational) clearly offers much 
more promise to explain the observed volume of trading in the stock market. If a shock 
changes the valuations that different agents put on a share price, it is easy to see that this 
may give rise to trading, and this effect might be reinforced if some agents are irrational and 
interpret the implications of the shock very differently from the way in which rational agents 
do. 
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13. Methodological Implications 
The assumption that all agents are rational is often made in macroeconomics and in 
many other areas of economics. In response to abundant evidence that many agents cannot 
plausibly be described as rational in many of the decisions they make, advocates of rational 
expectations have often argued that their results go through provided that ‘enough’ agents 
are rational. However, while models where just a fraction of agents are rational may under 
certain circumstances generate the same results as models where all agents are rational, 
under some other conditions they do not. Instead of assuming that all agents are rational in 
models, perhaps we should assume that only some are, and equilibrium is where rational 
agents cannot make themselves better off. 
However, the concept of rationality is quite complicated. Rationality seems a 
reasonable assumption for many of our decisions. Most of us would (say) choose a deposit 
account paying 3% to an identical deposit account paying 2%. When the decisions become 
more complicated, though, the assumption of rationality becomes more dubious. We might 
think of rational decision making as consisting of weighing the evidence and making a 
decision that tends to bring about whatever goal we might wish to achieve. If rationality is 
envisaged in such a way, there is no difficulty in supposing that rational agents may differ in 
their expectations. And although some basic rationality seems reasonable, the very 
demanding form of rationality that seems to be required for some results in economics (such 
as the common knowledge assumption) seems quite unreasonable. Nevertheless, even if 
some assumptions of rationality seem unreasonable, it is not often clear how to relax them. 
Appendix II discusses these issues at greater length. 
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The upshot is that we do need to seriously consider models where some agents have 
rational, yet heterogeneous expectations, but others have irrational expectations. Modelling 
these expectations and how they might change over time is clearly no trivial task. But also, 
working out how overall equilibrium is determined with such heterogeneity of agents is a 
major challenge as well. What our discussion has suggested is that the presence of irrational 
agents and heterogeneous rational expectations may make little difference in some 
circumstances, but may make a big difference in others. Building appropriate models to 
explore this issue is an important item on the research agenda. 
A further point is that once one allows for heterogeneity of expectations, the 
decisions of rational agents become much more complicated. It is no longer sufficient for 
them to just attempt to work out a share’s fundamental value (difficult though that may be) 
when deciding whether to buy a share. They also need to try to predict what other agents 
are likely to do, and such prediction requires them to try to predict what these agents 
predict other agents will do, and so forth. Clearly, building such models may be extremely 
difficult indeed. Nevertheless, we may often need to go beyond the assumption of a 
homogenous representative agent. The current paper suggests that models that relax this 
assumption is some particular way – say by admitting a mixture of rational and irrational 
agents, or by assuming heterogeneous rational agents, may possess considerable additional 
explanatory power. 
14. Empirical Evidence 
 In this section we mention a few empirical studies the results of which are 
particularly relevant for the approach we are developing. 
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Guidolin and Timmermann (2005) present ‘empirical evidence of regimes with very 
different risk and return characteristics for UK stocks and bonds. Our results suggest that a 
three-state specification with a transitory high-volatility regime with negative mean returns, 
a highly persistent, ‘normal’ state with mean returns and volatility levels close to historical 
averages and a persistent high-return ‘bull’ state capture important features of UK stock and 
bond returns.’ (op. cit., p. 141.) 
This seems to fit the GTSM exactly! However the paper is entirely atheoretical – the 
authors make no effort at all to explain their results in terms of any theory. 
In a recent paper Ahn et al (2014) present evidence that the shares of Motors 
Liquidation Company (the company that used to be known as General Motors) were 
overpriced. They develop a theoretical asset-pricing model that includes both rational 
speculators and uninformed investors, which has a state where all rational agents exit and 
the share price is inflated. This seems to correspond exactly with our bear market state. 
There are several papers which study the effects of dispersion in investors’ beliefs for 
stock prices. One example is Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002). 
15. Implications for Investor Behaviour 
The GTSM may not have radically different implications for investor behaviour from 
the EMH, but it does have some. Certainly in the fundamental state, a ‘buy and hold’ 
strategy seems optimal, with periodic ‘rebalancing’ of the portfolio in order to preserve 
adequate diversification (as is also an implication of the EMH). However, at any one point in 
time, some shares may be overvalued and hence should not be bought; it may take some 
research in order to identify them. 
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 If the market is in a bubble state, then it is quite rational to participate. However, it is 
not clear whether rational investors should be able to predict the end of a bubble. If they 
can, then it would seem to be a clear implication that one should sell in those circumstances. 
In a bear state, presumably the implication is that one should not buy shares; indeed, one 
should sell the shares one has; however it is perhaps implausible for all shares to be 
overvalued. Instead, it may be advisable to avoid overvalued shares and purchase shares 
that are valued at their fundamental value. 
16. Further Issues 
There are many issues to which the GTSM might be applied and on which it may give 
useful insights. 
One question is whether it applies to individual stocks or to the stock market as a 
whole. It should be quite clear that different shares can be in different states. For example, 
there is nothing in the approach which precludes some shares being priced at their 
fundamental values and others being above their fundamental levels, being either in a bear 
market or bubble. Rational agents might hence hold both fundamentally priced shares and 
those in a bubble state. Irrational agents would be the sole holders of shares that are in a 
bear market state, but they might hold both fundamentally priced shares and bull market 
shares as well. 
Another interesting question is whether the approach is applicable to other asset 
markets such as housing. It is, of course, quite common to talk of ‘housing price bubbles’ and 
so forth. However, heavy transactions costs in buying and selling houses means that a basic 
arbitrage equation such as equation (1) is unlikely to hold for housing, even approximately – 
instead, one would get a pair of inequality constraints. 
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The approach might have implications for the international correlation of stock 
markets. In a fundamental market, shares prices might be correlated internationally because 
of common shocks – i.e. changes in fundamentals that affect many countries. If shares can 
be in a bull or bear market, then other possibilities emerge. In a bull market, there might be 
international transmission of sentiment, so share prices might be more highly correlated 
than in a fundamental market. However, in a bear market, it is not clear that shocks to 
fundamentals will change share prices, so prices might be much less correlated 
internationally.5 
Sometimes a tax on trading such as a Tobin tax has been advocated as a way of 
reducing stock market volatility (e.g. see the discussion in Shiller, 2000, pp. 225 – 8). It is 
easy to see that such a tax should raise volatility in a fundamental market, as the greater the 
costs of buying or selling a share, the more an undervalued share will have to fall below its 
fundamental value before rational speculators have an incentive to buy it. But in a bull 
market it may be different. A transactions tax may deter speculators from buying a share 
and hence might prevent a bubble from occurring, or at least might reduce its magnitude. So 
the effect of such a tax on share price volatility might well depend on the regime the stock 
market is in. Clearly, this is something that needs to be explored in a formal model. 
17. Summary of Main Points 
1. The stock market may be in one of three states: a fundamental state in which share prices 
(approximately) equal their fundamental values, a bull market in which prices exceed their 
fundamental value but the efficient market condition (1) holds, and a bear market where 
equation (1) does not hold and shares are overvalued. 
                                                 
5
 Quinn and Voth (2008) provide some evidence on the international correlation of stock market returns.  
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2. In the fundamental state shares may not exactly equal their fundamental values because 
of transactions and calculation costs. Shares may also be somewhat above their fundamental 
values because of the expectation (by rational agents) that the shares might enter a bull 
market or bear market state. 
3. Bubbles can occur. In developing models of bubbles the extreme rationality assumptions 
that are often made in models of bubbles need to be relaxed; appropriate models of bubbles 
should hence be developed assuming a mixture of rational and irrational agents. 
4. In a bear market, the marginal investor is irrational. It could be that all shares are held by 
irrational agents, with rational agents being unable to exploit the overvaluation because of 
short-selling constraints. But optimistic rational agents could hold shares in a bear market, 
provided that the marginal investor is irrational. 
5. It is also important to consider the implications of assuming heterogeneous rational 
agents in the fundamental market. 
 What is new about the GTSM? Although most of the ‘ingredients’ of the GTSM are 
not new (e.g. the point about short-selling constraints giving rise to overvaluation goes back 
to Miller, 1977), we would claim the way in which the ingredients are combined to produce 
the overall theory is novel. We would point out that in the theory shares can be overvalued 
for two very different reasons. The first is that they are overvalued because they are 
expected to rise still further in price (i.e. there is a bubble). The second is that they are 
overvalued because they are held exclusively by irrational agents and rational agents cannot 
exploit the overvaluation because of short-selling constraints. The two states in which share 
prices are overvalued can be expected to behave in very different ways. In the first, share 
prices might be expected to rise on average over time and in the second they might be 
36 
 
expected to fall. It is not clear that this possibility (that overvalued shares may behave in 
very different ways) has been recognised in the literature. We have also emphasised 
heterogeneity of investors’ expectations. Discussion of such heterogeneity is not of course 
absent from the literature. One important paper is De Long et al. (1990) who consider the 
interaction of irrational noise traders and rational arbitrageurs. Hong and Stein (2007) also 
survey much of the literature on investor heterogeneity. We would stress that this 
heterogeneity, which certainly exists, may affect the behaviour of the stock market in 
different ways in different circumstances. Again, it is not clear that this point has been 
recognised in the literature. 
18. Conclusions 
 The paper has argued that the stock market can best be understood as being 
comprised of a mixture of rational and irrational agents. There are several possible 
outcomes for the way the stock market behaves. The behaviour of the stock market may be 
determined entirely by the behaviour of rational agents; alternatively, there may be 
circumstances where share prices are determined by the decisions of irrational agents and 
rational agents cannot exploit any overvaluation this may give rise to. It has also been 
argued that there may be heterogeneous rational expectations; such an assumption does 
not contradict any basic principle of economics and may play a role in explaining the 
behaviour of the stock market. 
So the GTSM combines the insights of Fama, who argues for the efficiency of the 
stock market (it may be approximately efficient for much of the time under the GTSM) with 
the insights of Shiller (it can explain excess volatility, for example). There is plenty of room 
for behavioural economics to explain the behaviour of irrational agents, and the approach 
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can potentially integrate the insights of behavioural economics into an overall theory of the 
stock market. It should be able to construct a model which explains the reaction of stock 
prices to (say) an expansion by the central bank of its quantitative easing programme, 
something which behavioural economics by itself does not seem able to explain, so hence 
providing a genuine alternative to the EMH, and meeting Fama’s point quoted above. The 
theory should be able to explain the anomalies which the EMH finds extremely difficult to 
explain (excess volatility, overvaluation, bubbles, momentum effects, overreaction and 
underreaction), but is also compatible with it being impossible to systematically beat the 
market and with the stock market reacting to news. 
There is much work which needs to be done to develop such a theory, but we would 
claim that it does contain the essence of a satisfactory theory of the stock market. 
APPENDIX I 
An Example of Overvaluation 
Consider a firm which has just announced the following results:  
(1) In the year for which it is reporting results, it had revenues of £23.3m and a loss of 
£31.4m.  
(2) In the previous year it had revenues of £14.84m and a loss of £5.17m. 
(3) It has net cash of £96m. 
Also, it is regarded as a ‘world leader’ in a rapidly growing sector of the economy. 
Question: what would be a plausible estimate of the market value of the company? 
According to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH), share prices are determined as in 
equation (3), which we repeat here for convenience: 
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Let us try to estimate a plausible upper bound on the market value of the company. Consider 
the following scenario:  
1. In the next three years, the firm’s revenues grow to £100m., using its cash reserves which 
it exhausts at the end of the three years (so revenues double every 17 months or so in this 
period). 
2. In the following four years, its revenues grow from £100m to £400m. (i.e., they double 
every two years.) Assume it finances its expansion by internally generated funds. 
3. Thereafter, the firm’s revenues grow at 5% per year indefinitely, and it pays a dividend 
equal to 10% of its revenues (so its first dividend is £40m.)  
Then it is not too difficult to calculate that the firm’s market value in 7 years’ time, using a 
discount rate of 10%, will be £800m. This means its current market value will be about 
£400m. 
Is this credible? 
The above calculations are based on some extremely favourable assumptions about 
the firm’s behaviour. For example, it is assumed that its average rate of growth of revenues 
will be about 35% over the next ten years. According to Chan et al., 2003, only 2% of firms 
have annual sales growth rates in excess of 22% over a ten-year period, and these figures are 
biased upward by survivorship bias. Also, assuming that the firm can pay dividends equal to 
10% of revenues indefinitely after ten years seems very strong indeed. 
So it would seem that £400m is a considerable overestimate of what the firm’s 
market value should be; indeed it would seem to be a considerable overestimate of the 
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maximum plausible market value of the company, assuming that its price equals its 
fundamental value. 
However, perhaps it can now be revealed the firm in question is one called Baltimore 
Technologies, and the figures are those for March 2000. At the time its market value was 
£4.48bn, that is about eleven times a value which was argued to far exceed its fundamental 
value! It seems very difficult to avoid the conclusion that Baltimore Technologies was 
(massively) overvalued. 
APPENDIX II 
On the Rationality and Heterogeneity of Expectations 
We would make a number of contentions about expectations here. 
(1) There is often a huge amount of heterogeneity in expectations. 
(2) For some decisions, an assumption that virtually all agents making the decisions have 
rational expectations is defensible. For many other decisions, it is reasonable to suppose 
that some agents have rational expectations and other do not. Furthermore, there are some 
decisions for which an assumption of rational expectations is much less plausible for any 
agent. 
(3) It is plausible that those expectations, which may plausibly be regarded as ‘rational’, can 
differ between agents, sometimes massively. 
(4) As far as investors in the stock market is concerned, many investors make buying and 
selling decisions that in no reasonable way can be considered rational. 
To make a compelling case for these contentions would take a long time. The rest of 
this Appendix contains some discussion which is hopefully relevant although it may fall short 
of making a persuasive case. 
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On contention (1), for evidence on heterogeneity of shareholder expectations, see 
Bagwell (1991) and Booth (1993), footnote 7. 
As far as contention (2) is concerned, many decisions we make can plausibly be 
described as rational. For example, virtually everyone would pick up a £20 bill on the 
pavement (sometimes thought of as the archetypal rational decision). There are a number of 
well-established results in economics which hold because some agent can make a clear-cut 
unambiguous gain from acting in a particular way. One example is covered interest parity, 
which holds because some agents perceive and act upon opportunities to make riskless 
arbitrage profits. But for many other decisions, rationality seems much less plausible. 
Behavioural economists and psychologists have documented numerous biases and 
distortions in much of our decision making; Kahneman (2011) is the obvious reference. 
However, there are some decisions where rationality is much less plausible for any 
agent, or only is a reasonable assumption for a handful of specialist and exceptionally well-
informed individuals. Examples might include the level of rationality that each agent needs 
to possess if Ricardian equivalence is to hold, and the information some speculators need to 
possess and the calculations they need to do to rule out divergent dynamic paths in some 
optimizing macroeconomic models. 
Contention (3), that there may be heterogeneity in rational expectations, may seem a 
strange idea, and has scarcely featured in the literature, but it may be justified by supposing 
that each agent may have idiosyncratic information. Alternatively, it might be that it is costly 
to gather information, and agents gather different amounts of information, and hence may 
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have different expectations, because their costs of gathering information differ.6 At a casual 
level, we might note that many stockbrokers have widely differing recommendations on the 
same shares and it would be an uncontroversial statement that many well-informed people 
have radically divergent views on the same issues. To take the example that started the 
paper, Fama and Shiller are both outstanding academics who have spent their careers 
studying the stock market – if we do not consider them as ‘rational’ then who is? Yet they 
have very different views on how the stock market operates. This is surely one example of 
heterogeneous rational expectations. 
As far as contention (4) is concerned there is plenty of evidence that many traders in 
the stock market can by no means plausibly be described as rational. Here are some possible 
candidates for irrational or noise traders: 
(i) Managers of Index Funds. A considerable proportion of shares are held in index funds. 
Managers of index funds construct their portfolios so that the proportions of shares in these 
portfolios are the same as the weights of the shares in the index they are tracking, so if a 
particular share is given a weight of say 5% in the index, the fund will hold 5% of its portfolio 
in that share. Index funds are quite popular, and many funds that are not explicit index funds 
are believed to be ‘closet’ index trackers. Investing in tracker funds has an obvious attraction 
for believers in the EMH. If one cannot systematically beat the market, there is no point in 
wasting resources researching various shares - one may as well buy shares in an index fund, 
which hopefully can minimise transactions costs. However, this means that managers of 
index funds buy and sell shares for reasons completely unrelated to whether they are over-
or under-valued by fundamental criteria; the sole consideration is replicating the index. So if 
                                                 
6
 See Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) for one model in which agents may optimally have heterogeneous 
expectations. 
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a new company enters the index, the index fund has to buy the shares of that company even 
if its shares are overvalued. 
(ii) Institutional Investors Motivated by Relative Performance Criteria. Institutional investors  
are very important in the stock market, and it is commonly believed that they are motivated 
by relative performance criteria – i.e. that what matters is not how well or badly they 
perform in an absolute sense but how well or badly they perform relative to other 
institutional investors. This means that they shift their portfolios towards stocks that 
comprise their benchmark index. (See Basak and Pavlova, 2013.) 
(iii) Small Individual Traders. De Bondt (1998) presents survey evidence according to which 
many individual investors behave very differently from the way in which standard models 
predict. 
(iv) Technical Analysts. Such analysts try to predict stock price changes on the basis of past 
patterns in stock prices. An elaborate vocabulary has grown up around technical analysis; 
terms such as ‘resistance level, ‘support level’ and ‘head and shoulders pattern’ are 
commonly used. Typically, economists have been quite sceptical about technical analysis, 
sometimes asserting that it has the scientific status of astrology. Yet technical analysis is 
widely used by financial market professionals; according to one survey: ‘At a forecasting 
horizon of weeks, technical analysis is the most important form of analysis.’ (Menkhoff, 
2010, p. 2573.) 
These may be the main categories of noise or irrational traders; there are 
undoubtedly others. We might ask whether traders who only review their portfolios 
periodically should be considered irrational. Ascertaining fundamental values may be quite 
difficult and costly, so it may be rational for many investors to gather information about 
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their portfolios and whether their shares are over or undervalued periodically. But the 
archetypal rational investor needs to be constantly updating his or her information and be 
ready to trade when they perceive a mis-valuation. It is difficult to believe that many 
investors come anywhere close to doing this. 
This Appendix is intended to make the case that for many decisions, including stock 
market investment decisions, there is a huge amount of heterogeneity. We may make a 
distinction for analytical purposes between rational and irrational traders, which may shed 
some insights, but even this distinction is simplistic. (We would expect many noise traders to 
act rationally in many situations, such as picking up £20 notes on the pavement.) 
Characterising the heterogeneity of agents, and developing models of the stock 
market which incorporate this heterogeneity, is clearly no easy task. It needs to be an 
important part of the research agenda over the next few years.  
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